U.S. Fumbling
Postwar Plan
Hussein
Ibish, LA Times 9 April 2003
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If
concern is growing that ideological convictions at the Defense Department
resulted in costly miscalculations regarding the war in Iraq, even
greater alarm is warranted by glaring missteps in the preparation
for what comes after the war.
Take, for instance, the political profile of the man tapped to lead
the occupation, retired Lt. Gen. Jay Garner.
Garner's stated opinions on Middle Eastern politics make him singularly
unsuitable for the indescribably sensitive task of being the first
U.S. administrator of a large Arab country. In 2000, Garner signed
a statement backing Israel's hard-line tactics in enforcing the occupation
of the Palestinian territories of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and
Gaza Strip.
This statement, which was organized by the Jewish Institute for National
Security Affairs, a think tank close to the Israeli far right, praised
the Israel Defense Forces' "remarkable restraint in the face
of lethal violence orchestrated by the leadership of a Palestinian
Authority" and advised the strongest possible American support.
Anyone with the slightest knowledge of Arab politics knows that any
association between an American occupation of Iraq and Israel's occupation
of Palestinian lands poses great danger. It is guaranteed to breed
deep resentment and bitter opposition, especially as U.S. checkpoints
in Iraq begin to look increasingly like those in the West Bank.
Persistent reports in the British and American press suggest that
Garner will be in charge of 23 ministries, each headed by an American
with Iraqi advisors. Not only will this look and feel like a colonial
administration, the identity of some of the Iraqi advisors rings alarms.
Most disturbing is the role apparently planned for Ahmad Chalabi,
head of the Iraqi National Congress, a U.S.-created opposition group
based in London with no visible presence or support in Iraq. He is
extremely popular with the neoconservatives in and around the administration,
including Vice President Dick Cheney and Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz.
In the Middle East, however, Chalabi is also known for swindling tens
of millions of dollars from a bank he headed in Jordan. In April 1992,
he was sentenced in absentia to 22 years' hard labor on 31 charges
of embezzlement, theft, misuse of depositor funds and speculation
with the Jordanian dinar. For many months this man has been demanding
that Washington appoint him prime minister of Iraq. It is cold comfort
indeed to learn that he will be Garner's "advisor" at a
ministry of finance.
Other early signs for how the administration of Iraq will function
are equally not encouraging.
The management of the port of Umm al Qasr, one of the few places in
Iraq under complete Western control, has produced a split between
British and American authorities. The British view is that the Iraqi
manager, who has been in his position for years, is capable of doing
the job. Our government insisted, however, in providing a lucrative
contract to run the port to Stevedoring Services of Seattle.
Australia has expressed concern that its existing wheat contracts
with Iraq will be transferred to U.S. interests.
This appears to be the pattern set for most such arrangements in Iraq,
with not only allies, the United Nations and major nongovernmental
organizations frozen out of the process but with local Iraqis as well,
in favor of American corporations.
Some NGOs, of course, will be present in Iraq, and one of the first
to announce its intention to follow in the footsteps of the invasion
force is the evangelical organization led by Franklin Graham. Graham,
who has repeatedly insisted that Islam is a "very evil, wicked
religion," will hardly be a reassuring presence to ordinary Iraqis.
The behavior of some of our troops has also provided ominous signs
of political problems to come. Gestures such as naming Army bases
in Iraq after Exxon and captured airstrips "George W. Bush International
Airport" do not convey a message of liberation.
Between Garner, Chalabi, Stevedoring, Graham and "Camp Exxon,"
not to mention the checkpoints, the prospects for winning the hearts
and minds of Iraqis seem dim indeed.
Hussein Ibish is communications director for the American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee. This article was first printed in the
LA Times on 4 April 2003.
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